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Park Slope Jewish Center v. Congregation B'nai Jacob7
(decided October 16, 1997)
The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff,
Park Slope Jewish Center's, complaint,7 which sought
compensation for the use and occupancy of plaintiffs lower
sanctuary by defendant, Congregation B'nai Jacob.
The
complaint, which also sought ejectment of the defendant from the
premises, was dismissed because the court held that the complaint
"presented a controversy over religious doctrine that the courts
could not resolve." 79 Plaintiff appealed to the New York State
Court of Appeals, arguing that resolution of this matter by the
courts would not violate the Federal Constitution,O specifically
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution.8 The New York State Court of Appeals
reversed the order of the Appellate Division holding that the
action could have been resolved by applying "neutral principles
of law." 2
The dispute arose in 1983 after the majority of the membership
of the plaintiff's synagogue voted to grant equal rights of worship
to women.3 Since the more orthodox members of the synagogue
could not abide by this decision, they formed their own
congregation, the Congregation B'nai Jacob which held separate
services at the Center.A In this same year, plaintiff, brought an
action against the defendants for trespass." Plaintiff's action was
'n
90 N.Y.2d 517, 664 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1997).
78 Id.
at 519, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
79

id.

U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ... " Id.
81Park Slope Jewish Center, 90 N.Y.2d at 521, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
2 Id. at 522, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
83 d. at 519, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
8 id.
8o

85 Id.
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resolved by a stipulation in the New York State Supreme Court in
May of 1984,86 providing plaintiff the right to retain ownership
of the premisesY More specifically, plaintiff was given the right
to hold its services in the main sanctuary, while the defendant
was given permission to use the lower sanctuary for holding its
religious services.8 The stipulation also entitled the plaintiff to
be paid $460 per month by the defendant for using the lower
sanctuary. 9 The members of the defendant's congregation were
able to become members of the plaintiffs congregation on the
same terms as plaintiff's members, however, plaintiff was given
the right to decide the criteria for membership without any
limitations. 90 Any of the membership dues paid to the plaintiff by
any members of the defendant's congregation would be credited
to the defendant against the payments made for occupation and
use. 9' Also provided in the stipulation was an order that
"[n]either party would interfere with the other party's services,
programs, membership enrollments, visitors or individual
members; and, should the building be sold or demolished, net
proceeds would be distributed 70% to the plaintiff and 30% to the
defendant. "92
After several members of the defendant's congregation
submitted applications for membership with the plaintiff, plaintiff
amended its bylaws to require all members to support the equal
rights of women to worship. Defendant then brought a motion
to have the newly amended bylaws declared void, which the
lower court granted because the amendment was barred by the
parties' stipulation2 4 After an appeal by the plaintiff, the

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89 Id.

90 Id. at 519-20, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 236.

9192 Id. at 520, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 236.

Id.

93 Id. at 520, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 236-37.
91 Id. at 520, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citing Park Slope Jewish Center v. Stem,

128 Misc. 2d 909, 491 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1985)).
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Appellate Division reversed,9 holding that "judicial resolution of
the membership dispute would violate the Establishment Clause
of the United States Constitution. "96 The New York State Court
of Appeals dismissed an appeal from that order based on nonfinality.97 After the matter was remitted back to the lower court,
an order was issued "purporting to permit the defendant to take a
credit against its use and occupancy payments for its members
who had applied for membership with the plaintiff, but had been
denied." 9 The New York State Court of Appeals dismissed an
appeal from that order due to the lack of finality as well.9
"From the time of that supreme court order, the defendant had
not tendered any payments to plaintiff for the use and occupancy
of the premises." 100

Subsequently, plaintiff commenced three actions for eviction
against the defendant congregation in King's County Civil Court,
which were all dismissed. 1 1 Defendant then commenced an
action of its own seeking declaratory judgment of the rights and
obligations of the parties under the stipulation.1 " InJanuary of
1991, the Supreme Court, Kings County, granted a motion by the
plaintiff to have the case dismissed.1 3 The Second Department
affirmed the supreme court, holding that there was no cause of
action to be resolved. °
Plaintiff then commenced the present action "[s] eeking payment
for seventy-two months' use and occupancy and for ejectment of

95

Id.

6Id. (citing Park Slope Jewish Center v. Stem, 128 Misc. 2d 847, 513
N.Y.S.2d 767 (2d Dep't 1987)).
9 Id. (citing Park Slope Jewish Center v. Stem, 70 N.Y.2d 746, 514 N.E.2d
390,
519 N.Y.S.2d 1032 (1987)).
9
8 id.

19 Id. (citing Park Slope Jewish Center v. Stem, 72 N.Y.2d 873, 528 N.E.2d
517,
532 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1988)).
00
1 Id.
101

Id.

0

' 2 Id.

103Id.

'oId. (citing B'nai Jacob v. Park Slope Jewish Center, 199 A.D.2d 296, 604
N.Y.S.2d 255 (2d Dep't 1993)).
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the defendant congregation from the premises." los Both plaintiff
and defendant moved for summary judgment and the supreme
court denied both motions, basing its decision on the prior
holding of the Appellate Division that the courts should not
resolve this or other "religious"

disputes.106

The Appellate

Division affirmed the Supreme Court and it held that a "judicial
resolution would violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution."17 Plaintiff and
defendant both appealed to the New York State Court of Appeals,
and the court dismissed defendant's claim because defendant
"[w]as not a party aggrieved by the court's order." 0
The Court of Appeals began its analysis of the case at bar
through the comparison and application of the doctrine used in
First Presbyterian Church v. United Presbyterian Church.1' 9 In
First Presbyterian Church, the Court of Appeals decided a
dispute involving a local church in Schenectady, New York, and
its denominational church faction." 0 One of the main issues of
that dispute involved the power over controlling the property of
the local church."' The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibited the
courts from entertaining such matters as those found to be at issue
because a court ruling would "[s]imultaneously establish one
religious belief as correct for the organization while interfering
with the free exercise of the opposing faction's belief.""'
However, the Court of Appeals did hold that the courts were able
to address this matter "[t]o the extent that the plaintiff sought to
enjoin defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs use of the
property, because the courts could do so without having to decide
at 520-21, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
'06 Id. at 521, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
105Id.

"o'
Id. (citing Park Slope Jewish Center v. Congregation B'nai Jacob, 230

A.D.2d 779, 646 N.Y.S.2d 624 (2d Dep't 1996)).
"oId. (citing Park Slope Jewish Center v. Congregation B'nai Jacob, 89

N.Y.2d 964, 678 N.E.2d 495, 655 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1997)).
962 N.Y.2d 110, 464 N.E.2d 454, 476 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1984).

110 Id. at 113, 464 N.E.2d at 456, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
111Id.

"2Id.at 116, 464 N.E.2d at 457-58, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
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which body had authority to control the property under church

law."2

113

In Jones v. Wolf,"4 a "dispute over the ownership of church
property following a schism in a local church affiliated with a

hierarchical church organization led to court action." "' A faction
of church-goers voted to separate themselves from the
Presbyterian Church of the United States." 6 This faction then
united themselves with another church denomination, and
proceeded to retain possession and control of the local church
property.117 A commission was appointed by the Presbytery of
Augusta-Macon to investigate the dispute.'
This commission
eventually determined that the minority that would not separate
themselves from the Presbyterian Church of the United States
was the "true congregation."' 119 The members of this minority
then brought suit in state court,' seeking "[d]eclaratory and
injunctive orders establishing their right to exclusive possession
and use of the local church property." 2 The case was eventually
heard on appeal by the Supreme Court of the United States,
which ultimately held that "[a] State court is entitled to adopt a
'neutral principles of law' analysis as a means of resolving church
property disputes." 12 It is this "neutral principles of law"
analysis which was used to determine First Presbyterian
Church,12 as well as the case at bar. 4
Under the "neutral principles of law" analysis, the focus of the

court is not only on "[t]he language of instruments such as deeds,
Park Slope Jewish Center, 90 N.Y.2d at 521, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citing
First Presbyt. Church, 62 N.Y.2d 110, 118, 464 N.E.2d 454, 458, 476
113

N.Y.S.2d 86, 90).

114 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
115
Id.at 595.
116 id.

117Id.
118m.d

119 Id.

2 Id.

121

Id.

12id.
123 62 N.Y.2d 110, 464 N.E.2d 454, 476 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1984).
124 90 N.Y.2d 517, 664 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1997).
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but also on such factors as 'the terms of the local church charter,
the State statutes governing the holding of church property, and
the provisions in the constitution of the general church concerning
the ownership and control of church property."
It is, however,
very important that courts take "special care to scrutinize the
documents in purely secular terms and not to rely on religious
precepts in determining whether they indicate that the parties
26
have intended [a particular result]." 1
Here, the Court of Appeals held that it could resolve the
dispute through the application of these "neutral principles of
law" because "[n]o doctrinal issue will be passed upon, no
implementation of a religious duty is contemplated, and no
interference with religious authority will result."' 127 It is the
stipulation in which the parties entered into in 1984 which the
Court of Appeals used to "provide the framework for the
resolution of this dispute."'2 The stipulation involved was used
as a means of settling the argument between the feuding
congregations which began as a religious disagreement, but was
eventually settled through the use of secular terms.'29 These
secular terms not only provided for ownership of the premises,
the part of the temple that each congregation was allowed to use,
the payments for such use, and the percentage distribution that
each congregation was entitled to should the premises be sold or
destroyed, but the stipulation also did not limit the plaintiff's right
to determine the necessary criteria for membership. 30 The
enforcement of this criteria of membership provision "did not
'2

126

Id. at 521-22, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 238.

Id. at 522, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 238 (citing First Presbyterian, 62 N.Y.2d at

122, 464 N.E.2d at 461, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 93).

Id. (quoting Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 115, 446 N.E.2d 136,
139, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, 575 (1983)). In Avitzur, the New York Court of
Appeals held that "secular terms of the married parties' binding prenuptial
agreement to arbitrate any post marital religious obligations before a specified
rabbinical tribunal, which were entered into as part of a religious ceremony,
127

were enforceable" and the matter could be judicially resolved through the

application of "neutral principles of law." Id.
" Park Slope Jewish Center, 90 N.Y.2d at 522, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
129

Id.

130Id.
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require a state court to determine whether a particular criterion is
in violation of religious law." ' Rather, the court had the ability
to determine "[t]he amount of membership credits against the use
and occupancy payments based upon the number of defendant's
members who have been admitted to membership in the plaintiff's
congregation under the application of the membership criteria." In
The Court of Appeals had also determined that plaintiff's claim
for the ejectment of the defendant from the premises could also
be based upon the application of "neutral principles of law" as
13 3

well.

In Park Slope Jewish Center, the Court of Appeals recognized
the implication of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution when
dealing with church property dispute cases, but the Court of
Appeals also recognized "[t]hat courts are free to decide such
disputes if they can do so without resolving underlying
controversies over religious doctrine." '3 Due to this recognition,
the Court of Appeals both adopted and applied the "neutral
principles of law" approach, which had been developed by the
Supreme Court of the United States for use in such disputes
involving church property.' 3

1'
32

1

33

1

Id.
Id.

Id.

134Park Slope Jewish Center, 90 N.Y.2d at 521, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
13 5
Id.at 521, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 237-38 (citing First Presbyt. Church v. United
Presbyt. Church, 62 N.Y.2d at 119-20, 464 N.E.2d at 459, 476 N.Y.S.2d at
91). See also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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